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When Should Companies Go Global? 
 
Since different industries are structured differently, knowing the level of, and changes 
in industry concentration can help managers determine what global strategy to adopt to 
become more competitive. 
 
by Chris Carr and David Collis 
 
Chris Carr is Professor of Corporate Strategy at the University of Edinburgh Business 
School, in Scotland. David Collis is the Thomas Henry Carroll Ford Foundation Adjunct 
Professor of Strategy at Harvard Business School.  Comment on this article 
at http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/should-you-have-a-global-strategy/ , or contact the 
author at smrfeedback@mit.edu. 
 
 
 
Senior executives weighing strategies appropriate for today’s global economy will hear 
contradictory advice.  Some say you need to move quickly to establish a worldwide 
presence before competitors; others cite data showing that this is often less profitable. 
Those making the case for taking a global approach, including Thomas Friedman in The 
World Is Flat, argue that success requires treating the world as a single entity. Those 
advocating a more geographically restricted, regional strategy say that the world is, at 
best, semi-integrated, and that smart companies can capitalize on regional and country 
differences. The reality is that neither approach is appropriate for every circumstance. 
Therefore, executives need to understand when to pursue one route and when to pursue 
the other. 
 
 
 
In our view, the criteria need to be tied the dynamics of the particular industry, 
specifically the concentration levels of the four largest competitors (what we call the 
global CR4 ratio). Our analysis of 50 industries reveals extremely high global 
concentration ratios averaging 50% - just 1.5% higher than eight years ago. This small 
increase does not by itself say that industry is becoming more global. In fact, it conceals 
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dramatic differences from industry to industry: some, such as steel and cement, have seen 
huge increases in concentration; others, such as autos, have actually seen a decline in 
global concentration. To appreciate the strategic impact of these changes, one must 
recognize that these two variables (global CR4s and changes in these global CR4s) frame 
four competitive scenarios (see “Sectoral Global Concentration Trends”). Each scenario 
has a different opportunity for profit and a different set of implications for how 
companies can compete. Knowing your industry’s global CR4, and whether this is 
increasing or decreasing, can help you decide what you should or shouldn’t do 
strategically. 
 
 
 
A Case for Globalization 
 
Traditionally, economists such as Scherer and Ross found that by the time that the four 
largest players in a domestic industry achieved a combined market share approaching 
40%, they would fully recognize their mutual interdependence. By this point, attempts to 
gain market share by one company were expected to spur responses from rivals, 
encouraging oligopolistic collusion. By the time global CR4’s reach the same 40% point, 
we think leading players need to acknowledge their mutual interdependence and adopt a 
global strategy. Even where the level of concentration is lower, we think that managers 
can still make a compelling case for globalization where CR4s are increasing and 
beginning to approach this critical 40% threshold. 
 
 
 
When airplanes first broke the sound barrier, test pilots had difficulty controlling their 
aircraft (indeed, several crashed) until engineers realized that control principles, as we 
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approach and surpass the sound barrier, are different from those below it. We see an 
analogous phenomenon occurring with regard to companies’ understanding of industry 
concentration. Falling global concentration is traditionally treated by economists as a sign 
of international fragmentation and of competition not being truly global. However, once 
this critical threshold of 40% is approached, falling CR4s can also mean that global 
incumbents are being challenged by new competitors, and that global wars are finally 
breaking out in earnest. 
 
 
 
In the context of the global economy, concentration levels tend to decrease when 
countries that were previously outside the established international marketplace become 
major markets themselves. Indigenous companies from emerging markets often succeed 
at developing strong positions within those markets and then use those positions to gain 
global market share. For example, Haier Group, the Chinese consumer electronics and 
home appliance maker, parlayed its domestic cost advantages and business model 
developed to meet market needs in China into a growing market share elsewhere. Such 
gains don’t portend the demise of globalization; rather, they suggest that incumbents need 
to develop global strategies to confront threats from emerging global competitors. 
 
 
 
The world automobile industry offers a useful example. This market has seen slightly 
reduced concentration in the past two decades. However, if anything, the current level of 
competition in Asia and the extent to which competitors such as South Korea’s Kia and 
Hyundai have made market inroads in Europe and North America point to an 
increasingly dynamic industry. What had been a cozy global oligopoly that provided a 
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protective umbrella to weaker international players such as Chrysler has given way to all- 
out global war. Under this scenario where the global CR4 has already reached the critical 
40% level, falling industry concentration is actually a harbinger of increasing global 
rationalization and rivalry, and it spells big trouble for all but the most committed 
international players. 
 
 
 
Reading the Data 
 
Global concentration levels and changes in these levels can help point companies to the 
most effective strategies (see “Sectoral Global Concentration Trends”). Based on our 
analysis of industry data, we have identified four contexts and likely evolutionary paths: 
• Global oligopolies. Industries with global concentration ratios above 40% and 
increasing concentration levels are “global oligopolies.” In such industry 
environments (example: mobile phones), oligopoly power is both high and 
increasing as incumbents attempt to leverage their scale advantages. 
• Global wars. Industries where the concentration is above 40% but where the 
concentration level is decreasing have a different dynamic, one we call “global 
wars.” In these settings, incumbent global champions are ceding market share to 
aggressive new rivals. 
• Regional and national terrains. Industries where concentration levels are below 
 
40% and where concentration is low or declining (as is common in the service 
sector) tend to be organized either regionally or nationally as opposed to globally. 
• Shifting terrains. Industries where changes are in train and where concentration, 
while modest, may be growing rapidly (for example, steel) can be described as 
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shifting terrains.  In these sectors, companies should pay careful attention to the 
shift from local to global strategy. 
Since the nature of competition differs from industry to industry, the strategy 
recommendations vary.  However, managers should be wary of dismissing scenarios 
other than their own as irrelevant. As we will show, patterns of evolution are dynamic; 
terrains often undergo significant changes as globalization proceeds. 
 
 
 
Global oligopolies. The global oligopolies terrain is a relatively forgiving environment 
for companies at this stage of industry evolution. Indeed, given the generous profit 
margins, it could even prove hospitable to weaker international players. There are three 
main ways to become a participant in this industry structure, each of which requires 
international integration. 
 
 
 
The first way to become a major player is through innovation in developing new industry 
sectors. For example, in digital technologies, Microsoft, Google and Facebook, 
respectively, quickly established dominant positions. All scooped huge global industry 
profit shares through winner-takes-all effects, though outright monopolies are 
unacceptable to regulations, and innovation advantages alone are rarely sustainable. 
 
 
 
The second way is to leverage scale and specialization, as can be seen in capital-intensive 
businesses such as aerospace, glass, domestic appliances, and tires.   This strategy is 
typically deployed by incumbents. “Domestic appliance” global leaders Whirlpool and 
Electrolux, for example, leveraged domestic scale before expanding their geographic 
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footprint to further economies of scale; and, again even more recently, Haier, the new 
global number four, succeeding in leveraging a focus on smaller and lower price 
products, together with labor cost advantages and the scale afforded by China’s huge, 
fast-growing market. 
 
 
 
The third approach is through ambitious global consolidation strategies using mergers and 
acquisitions. The beer industry provides a good example. Until the 1990s, beer was 
largely a domestic business; national players such as Bass in the United Kingdom and 
Anheuser-Busch in the United States were extremely profitable. Then a few players, such 
as S&N in Europe and SAB in Africa, began build regional market positions through 
acquisitions. Within a few years, global consolidation reshaped the industry, with SAB 
taking over Miller, and Heineken and Carlsberg dividing up S&N. Brazil’s AmBev 
merged with Belgium’s Interbrew and finally Anheuser-Busch. Over the past decade, 
every substantial national player in Britain, France and the United States has disappeared. 
 
 
 
Overall the first approach still tends to be the preserve of highly innovative players from 
advanced “Triad” regions; but notice how new emerging country champions are 
increasingly following suit on these second and third approaches to exploit any 
complacency by traditionally powerful incumbents. 
 
 
 
Global wars. Even while global concentration falls within an industry, the total number 
of industry incumbents often declines in this scenario. In competitive global businesses, 
there have to losers; while the market leaders might only lose share, companies that 
7  
managed to survive as national or regional champions find it increasingly difficult to hold 
on largely because of overcapacity. Such industry reshaping occurred recently in the auto 
industry. Indeed, the total number of auto manufacturers has declined steadily since 
World War II even as the new competitors from Japan, Korea, China, and India gained 
share. 
 
 
 
Regional competitors in this scenario can improve their ability to compete through 
international alliances and acquisitions, but to be a credible player they must commit 
themselves to genuine cross-border integration.  Ultimately, they need to be prepared to 
join forces with a global leader. Chrysler will almost certainly fare better in the global 
partnership with Fiat than it ever could have done under Cerberus’ ownership. Loss of 
sovereignty is a tough decision for any management team, but life does not end after 
integration. 
 
 
 
For new contenders in such globally competitive markets, learning to leverage innovative 
domestic business models through organic growth can be the most successful 
globalization path. Toyota and Honda provide good examples. Indeed, given the 
challenges of post-merger integration across continents, the last thing newcomers should 
attempt to do is imitate traditional players. In China, the struggles of both Lenovo (in 
computers) and TCL (in electronics) reflect this reality. 
 
 
 
Regional and national terrains.  The reality is that global consolidation is still not 
appropriate in many parts of the economy. Other sectors in this category would include 
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house-building, railways, and service businesses, such as hairdressers and dental services. 
These are sectors where the underlying economics support small, localized competitors 
due to low scale economies, greater logistical costs, differences in cultures and consumer 
tastes, or more importantly continuing regulatory or governmental barriers. It is highly 
unlikely that any single player would have the ability alter this terrain. In these markets, 
attempts to pursue global strategies are risky; indeed, they could destroy shareholder 
value. 
 
 
 
Shifting terrains. In some sectors, global concentration may not have yet occurred but 
change may be underway. Even in sectors that economists have considered national or 
regional, including steel, confectionery, airlines, spirits, cosmetics, and cement, we see 
increased jockeying for global market position, as the top four players close in on 40% 
concentration levels. 
 
 
 
Companies in sectors experiencing change should anticipate the effects of global 
concentration. Players with deep pockets have opportunities to make early moves to 
expand their market positions and sustain profits for many years. Some strategies rely 
almost exclusively on internal growth: for example, Spanish fashion retailer Inditex 
(Zara) has expanded from Europe to stores in 78 countries to become the world’s largest, 
most valuable listed fashion retailer. However, the need for rapid increases in scale may 
argue for growth through acquisitions. 
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The cement market offers an interesting case study. Long a fragmented and regional 
industry, it has recently become a battleground for global concentration, with Mexico’s 
CEMEX going head to head with France’s Lafarge and Switzerland’s Holcim for 
international market leadership. A similar dynamic is being played out in steel, where the 
geography of competition and strategy has been dramatically transformed in just the last 
decade by Mittal Steel from India. Nevertheless, companies pursuing global strategies 
need to be attentive to the needs of local customers and the business culture, and 
recognize that having standardized practices across the whole enterprise might not be the 
right approach. Wal-mart, for example, spent nearly a decade trying to establish itself in 
Germany before finally selling its German operation in 2006. 
 
 
 
Anticipating Turning Points 
 
Examples of companies that held firm to their local or regional strategies in the face of 
indications that their industry was becoming more concentrated and suffered accordingly 
are fairly common. In the traditional mobile phone market , for example, the global CR4 
increased from 49% in 1988 to 73% in 2008.  Nokia successfully leveraged its 
innovation-based strategy to build a global market share of 40%, with even stronger 
market positions in India (57%), Asia (46%), and Africa (66%). Motorola, by contrast, 
struggled, having largely restricted itself to the United States and South America, where 
it and Nokia each held 26% of the market. Globally, Motorola’s share declined to around 
 
10%.  Even Nokia must now raise its global game to a new level, because the new smart 
phone market segment is already experiencing a turning point. In early 2011, Nokia’s 
global share is just 29%, compared with Samsung at 18%, not to mention challenges from 
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new disruptor technologies from Blackberry, Apple and Google. This could mark the 
transition to our global war scenario. 
 
 
 
Since different industries are facing different circumstances, managers need to keep tabs 
on current conditions and what is likely to unfold. For example, it’s important to 
recognize the difference between a steady state “global oligopoly” and a “global war,” 
where global CR4 concentration levels fall as leading incumbents later cede ground to 
new overseas challengers, battling for supremacy. It’s also important to monitor how 
many significant players there are in your sector. If incumbent numbers are falling, you 
are probably entering into a highly competitive scenario. Misinterpreting these turning 
points can be dangerous. 
 
 
 
Finally, it’s important to keep in mind that Rome wasn’t built in a day and that full 
geographical integration doesn’t occur overnight. First, as successful companies such as 
Honda, Diageo and HSBC have shown, you need develop a roadmap for international 
expansion. We have provided an overview of the global concentration landscape and 
some initial measures, but beware. In the more sharply defined business segments where 
most companies compete, global concentration may already be a lot higher than in their 
sectors more broadly defined. The global CR4 for stainless steel is today 36%, twice that 
for steel taken overall. The need for a global strategy may prove even more acute on 
closer examination. 
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Exhibit: SECTORAL GLOBAL CONCENTRATION TRENDS 
 
Concentration levels are defined by the cumulative global market shares of the top four players, the CR4s. Most recent CR4s are shown on 
the vertical axis. Time periods vary but we show the same sectors’ CR4s for (on average) 8 years previously on the horizontal axis. If a 
sector is above the 45 degree diagonal line, concentration levels are increasing. Most crucial though is whether a sector is approaching 
anywhere near 40%; by this time we expect substantial global moves and countermoves. 
 
 
 
 
